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REEXAMINING THE APPLICATION OF
DURESS AND NECESSITY DEFENSES TO
PRISON ESCAPE IN THE CONTEXT OF
COVID-19
Bill Clawges*
The classic example of the necessity defense involves a prisoner
escaping from a burning prison. Surely, the law would not require them to
stay in the prison when doing so would put their life at an immediate and
grave risk. This example epitomizes the purpose of the necessity defense;
society would rather the prisoner survive and leave prison than die ablaze
while obeying the letter of the law. In recent years, the difference between
the two justification defenses of necessity and duress has become blurred,
especially in cases involving prison escape. Both are equally applicable, and
both are relevant in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, since prisoners
may be forced to choose between the consequences of contracting a serious
virus with access only to prison healthcare or committing a serious offense
by leaving prison.
This Comment presents the legal background of the necessity and
duress defenses with particular emphasis on their application to prison
escapes. It critiques the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision
regarding the application of these defenses to prison escapes. It also analyzes
the framework under which such defenses may be raised in the context of
COVID-19—both the potential problems and potential solutions. Overall,
this Comment illustrates the reality of healthcare in the current prison
system. With an aging population and inadequate access to healthcare and
sanitation, prisoners need relief sooner rather than later, lest they be forced
into the extreme option of fleeing the system altogether.

* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2022. Many thanks to Professor
Leonard Rubinowitz for providing inspiration and initial guidance for this topic; Professor
Alan Mills for his thoughtful comments on early drafts; and Danny Dvorak, Richard "Hitch"
Thompson, Leah Regan-Smith, and the rest of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
staff for their diligent edits, insightful comments, and constant support.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2020, nine prisoners escaped from the Pierre Community
Work Center, a women’s minimum-security institution in Rapid City, South
Dakota, by walking through an exterior door late in the evening.1 Within a
few months, law enforcement captured each of the nine women.2 At the time
of their escape, only one prisoner at the center had tested positive for the
COVID-19 virus.3 Even so, other prisoners at the center believed the women
1

Arielle Zionts, One of Nine Escaped State Inmates Booked into County Jail After
Possible COVID-19 Exposure, RAPID CITY J. (Mar. 24, 2020), https://rapidcityjournal.com/n
ews/local/crime-and-courts/one-of-nine-escaped-state-inmates-booked-into-county-jail-afterpossible-covid-19-exposure/article_dde96057-ee4a-54c8-9238-fa766a86ce48.html [https://p
erma.cc/B4MN-9ET5].
2
Danielle Ferguson, Last of Nine Inmates Who Escaped from Women’s Prison After
COVID-19 Case Arrested in Sioux Falls, ARGUS LEADER (Aug. 19, 2020, 10:51 AM), https://
www.argusleader.com/story/news/crime/2020/08/19/last-inmate-who-walked-awaywomens-prison-after-covid-19-case-arrested-sioux-falls/5605336002/
[https://perma.cc/4ZJZ-NP4W].
3
Zionts, supra note 1.
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escaped custody due to their fear of contracting the virus inside the prison
walls.4 Although escaping after one confirmed case may seem premature, the
escapees’ concerns were far from unfounded. On September 16, 2020, 102
of the 140 inmates in the institution had active COVID-19 cases.5
In November 2020, prisoners escaped from a second Rapid City
minimum-security institution; this time, two men left the Rapid City
Community Work Center approximately one day apart, on Friday and
Saturday.6 By Monday, the work center had forty-five active COVID-19
cases, and prisoners expected the number to increase rapidly.7 While the men
did not state their motive for leaving, other prisoners noted that the escapees
feared contracting COVID-19.8 The escapees at both Rapid City facilities
risked up to five years in prison if convicted of second-degree escape.9
On April 1, 2020, another prisoner, Richard Cephas, escaped from
federal prison in Butner, North Carolina.10 Like those in Rapid City, he cited
fear of contracting COVID-19 as the reason for his escape, despite the fact
that the prison had not yet had its first positive test for the virus.11 As a 55year-old man with a medical condition, Cephas feared that he was especially
susceptible to complications from the virus.12 After three weeks outside of
federal custody, he was captured.13 On October 20, 2020, he was sentenced

4
Arielle Zionts, Inmates, Loved Ones Describe Fear in Prison Where Woman Tested
Positive for COVID-19, RAPID CITY J. (Mar. 25, 2020), https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/loc
al/inmates-loved-ones-describe-fear-in-prison-where-woman-tested/article_c1ffee9d-10075107-a37e-d2c40d94da95.html#tracking-source=home-trending [https://perma.cc/RMP3-HJ
HN].
5
Update: After Pierre Prison COVID-19 Outbreak, Mass Testing Was Conducted, KOTA
(Sept. 17, 2020, 11:11 AM), https://www.kotatv.com/2020/09/17/womens-minimumsecurity-prison-experiences-covid-19-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/HV4R-V7NN].
6
Arielle Zionts, COVID-19, Escapes and Boarded-up Windows at the Rapid City Prison,
RAPID CITY J. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://rapidcityjournal.com/news/local/covid-19-escapes-andboarded-up-windows-at-the-rapid-city-prison/article_19703be0-e5de-52ac-85a8-e043a027b
2df.html [https://perma.cc/2RNE-R8KS].
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Ferguson, supra note 2.
10
Josh Shaffer, Inmate Says He Escaped N.C. Prison to Avoid COVID-19. Now, He Seeks
Leniency, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (Oct. 20, 2020), https://greensboro.com/news/state/inm
ate-says-he-escaped-n-c-prison-to-avoid-covid-19-now-he-seeks-leniency/article_ebdea1f612fc-11eb-a388-13b943192fba.html [https://perma.cc/8HDJ-6FAV].
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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to eighteen months in prison for his escape to be served consecutively with
his current sentence.14
The COVID-19 pandemic could create conditions where prison escape
is the only viable method by which a prisoner can avoid substantial injury or
death from infection. The correctional institutions in Rapid City and Butner
suffered substantial outbreaks, and the majority of prisoners at some other
institutions have been infected, resulting in thousands of deaths within the
prison system at-large.15 Further, the pandemic has placed a significant strain
on the medical system, and prisons are far from immune.16 In an overcrowded
or medically understaffed prison, prisoners—particularly those who are
especially susceptible to complications from the virus—may encounter a
situation where their lives are at risk, and their legal options are insufficient
to deal with the potential adverse health impacts. A prisoner may feel
compelled to escape a prison during a pandemic, as some already have.
Escapees could potentially rely on the defense of duress or necessity to
justify such an escape. These are affirmative justification defenses in which
the defendant’s conduct was criminal, but the situation required him to
engage in criminal conduct as the lesser of two evils.17 Essentially, these
defenses excuse criminal conduct as legally and practically justified based on
the circumstances.18 From a policy perspective, these defenses reflect
society’s preference to avoid the worse of two outcomes, even when the
better option is criminal.19 Defendants have invoked the necessity defense in

14

Minute Entry, United States v. Cephas, No. 5:20-cr-00209 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2020),
ECF No. 37.
15
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PANDEMIC RESPONSE REPORT: REMOTE INSPECTION OF
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX BUTNER iv (Jan. 2021), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/reports/21-031.pdf; Update: After Pierre Prison COVID-19 Outbreak, suora
note 5; see also Mary Van Beusekom, Studies Detail Large COVID Outbreaks at US Prisons,
Jails, CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.cidrap.umn.e
du/news-perspective/2021/04/studies-detail-large-covid-outbreaks-us-prisons-jails [https://
perma.cc/YT9F-Y2TZ]..
16
See generally Stacy Weiner, Prison Should Not Be a COVID-19 Death Sentence, ASS’N
OF AM. MED. COLLS. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/prison-shouldnot-be-covid-19-death-sentence [https://perma.cc/WM46-G294] (noting the frequency of
COVID-19 infections in prisons and identifying conditions that make prisons particularly
susceptible to outbreaks).
17
115 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 309 (2010).
18
Id.
19
Wayne H. Michaels, Have the Prison Doors Been Opened – Duress and Necessity as
Defenses to Prison Escape, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 913, 919 (1978).
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an effort to justify a wide variety of offenses,20 including prison escape.21
However, a prison escapee has not yet raised a justification defense in the
context of COVID-19 or any other pandemic, so whether courts will permit
this defense is untested.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the development of medical care in
prisons, the current state of prison healthcare, and the risks posed by the
spread of COVID-19 in these institutions. Part II will present the case law
and policy rationales underpinning the duress and necessity defenses in U.S.
law, especially as they relate to prison escapes. Part III will examine
problems with the Supreme Court’s decision to require a “bona fide attempt
at surrender” as a prerequisite for presenting justification defenses to prison
escapes and argue that this requirement usurps jury’s indispensable role as
fact-finder and unjustly requires escapees to return to prison while conditions
are still dangerous. Finally, Part IV will apply the justification defenses to
prison escapes in the context of COVID-19.
I. HEALTHCARE IN U.S. PRISONS & THE CONSEQUENCES OF COVID-19
By 1929, there were serious concerns regarding the spread of contagious
diseases within prisons.22 However, it was not until the 1970s that courts
began to recognize a prisoner’s right to medical care.23 In Campbell v. Beto,
the Fifth Circuit noted that courts could no longer “close their judicial eyes
to prison conditions which present a grave and immediate threat to health or
physical well-being.”24 Campbell involved a constitutional claim by a
prisoner who was forced to work and denied medication despite a history of
heart trouble that prison administrators recognized.25 In ruling in the
prisoner’s favor, the court noted that federal courts had previously granted
wide discretion to prison administrators in maintaining order and discipline,
but “practices which result in the deprivation of basic elements of adequate

20

See, e.g., United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 487 (2001)
(seeking to apply the necessity defense to the manufacture and distribution of marijuana).
21
See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 398 (1980).
22
Hallie E. Mitnick, Note, Estelle v. Gamble in a Post-Affordable Care Act World, 13
CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 797, 799 (2015).
23
See id. at 800. Prior to this, courts had recognized that the Eighth Amendment must
reflect “evolving standards of decency,” but they did not extend these protections to include a
right to medical care. Marc J. Posner, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard:
The Right of Those in State Custody to Receive High-Cost Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L. &
MED. 347, 348 (1992).
24
460 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1972).
25
Id. at 766–67.
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medical treatment” violate constitutional guarantees.26 As such, the Fifth
Circuit opened the door for additional federal courts to find that institutions
must provide a minimum standard of medical care to prisoners.
A. ESTELLE V. GAMBLE

Estelle v. Gamble was the first major judicial step in the development
of a constitutional right to healthcare while incarcerated. On November 9,
1973, J.W. Gamble injured his back on a work assignment while incarcerated
in the Texas Department of Corrections.27 After working for a few hours,
Gamble went to the prison hospital.28 While he was initially granted work
leave and accommodations, they were eventually revoked despite Gamble’s
continued complaints of severe symptoms that were exacerbated by manual
labor.29
The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case to determine whether
Gamble’s complaint sufficiently pled a violation by prison officials, as it
noted that the Eighth Amendment provides protections against “more than
physically barbarous punishments.”30 The Eighth Amendment encompasses
punishments that violate “evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”31 Most importantly, a showing of “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs” of prisoners violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”32
This is true when prison officials are unresponsive to prisoners’ needs, or
guards deny or delay necessary care.33
B. PRISON HEALTHCARE CHALLENGES: THE AGING PRISON
POPULATION & COVID-19

After Estelle, prison healthcare improved considerably.34 Even prior to
the impending onslaught of prisoner litigation, many prisons improved

26

Id. at 768.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 99 (1976).
28
Id.
29
See id. at 99–100.
30
Id. at 102, 108.
31
Id. at 102.
32
Id. at 104.
33
Id. at 104–05
34
See Maureen Mullen Dove, Law and Fact of Health Care in Prisons, 44 MD. BAR J. 4,
13 (2011).
27
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standards of healthcare to avoid lawsuits.35 These improvements included
“more professionalism in correctional healthcare,” “timely access to care,”
better qualified staff, and increased “continuity and coordination of care.”36
Despite some post-Estelle improvements, both the federal and state
prison healthcare systems are still unable to adequately meet the medical
needs of prisoners today. Since the beginning of their incarceration, 13.9%
of federal prisoners, 20.1% of state prisoners, and 68.4% of local jail
detainees received no form of medical examination.37 While more than 20%
of prisoners were taking a prescription medication at the beginning of their
incarceration, 26.3% of federal prisoners, 28.9% of state prisoners, and
41.8% of local jail detainees stopped taking these medications upon
imprisonment.38 From 2001 to 2016, mortality rates in both the state and
federal prison systems increased; illness accounted for 88.3% of state
prisoner deaths and 90.9% of federal prisoner deaths.39
Given that each year in prison reduces life expectancy by approximately
two years,40 an aging prison population poses significant challenges. In state
prisons, the number of prisoners over the age of 55 increased by 400%
between 1993 and 2013, while the total state prison population increased by
approximately 62%.41 Further, between 2001 and 2004, “[t]he death rate of
inmates age 55 and older was over 3 times higher than that of inmates age
45-54, and 11 times higher than those age 35-44.”42 Though this increase in
35

William J. Rold, Thirty Years After Estelle v. Gamble: A Legal Retrospective, 14 J.
CORR. HEALTHCARE 11, 18 (2008).
36
ROBERT B. GREIFINGER, Thirty Years Since Estelle v. Gamble: Looking Forward, Not
Wayward, in PUBLIC HEALTH BEHIND BARS: FROM PRISONS TO COMMUNITIES 1, 4 (Robert B.
Greifinger, Joseph Bick & Joe Goldenson eds., 2007).
37
Andrew P. Wilper, Steffie Woolhandler, J. Wesley Boyd, Karen E. Lasser, Danny
McCormick, David H. Bor & David U. Himmelstein, The Health and Health Care of US
Prisoners: Results of a Nationwide Survey, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 666, 669 (2009). Often,
prisoners stop taking these medications because the institution’s “access to health care and the
quality of that care are . . . deficient.” See id. at 666.
38
Id. at 669.
39
E. ANN CARSON & MARY P. COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MORTALITY IN STATE AND
FEDERAL PRISONS, 2001-2016 1 fig.1 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/msfp0116
st.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NGX-LAQK].
40
Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose–Response of Time Served in Prison on Mortality: New
York State, 1989–2003, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 523, 525 (2013).
41
E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., AGING OF THE STATE PRISON
POPULATION, 1993–2013 1 (2016). Compare TERRY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993 11 (1995), with E. ANN CARSON,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2013 4 (2014).
42
The Aging Inmate Comm. of the Md. Bar Ass’n Corr. Reform Council, Aging Inmates:
Correctional Issue and Initiatives, 44 MD. BAR J. 22, 24 (2011).
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the prisoner mortality rate is partially attributable to an aging population,
subpar prison healthcare also plays a substantial role.43
The aging prison population presents a difficult issue for prisons forced
to deal with a COVID-19 outbreak. The risk of severe complications from
COVID-19 increases with age, and elderly individuals are at the highest
risk.44 Traditionally, prison healthcare systems were designed to meet the
needs of younger prisoners rather than the current aging population.45 When
beneficial programs are available, older prisoners face “knowledge deficits,
feelings of futility, and insufficient motivation” about receiving treatment in
the prison context.46 As a result, male prisoners have an average “biological
age” that is ten to fifteen years older than their chronological age, which
means that they are prone to developing health problems fifteen years earlier
than they would if they had not been imprisoned.47 Despite elderly prisoners’
particular need for healthcare amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, few prisons
employ healthcare professionals with training in geriatrics or palliative
care.48 With an aging population and a lack of professionals prepared to
provide care, prisons are a dangerous place to catch the virus.
C. THE SPREAD OF COVID-19 IN PRISONS

The spread of COVID-19 has posed a significant threat to society atlarge, but it has spread even faster in prisons, causing grave problems. In both
state and federal prisons, prisoners are four times as likely to contract the
virus compared to the general population.49 Prisoners are twice as likely to
43

See generally Meghan A. Novisky, Avoiding the Runaround: The Link Between
Cultural Health Capital and Health Management Among Older Prisoners, 56 CRIMINOLOGY
643 (2018) (discussing inequities in prison healthcare and reasons prisoners often do not
receive adequate care).
44
COVID-19 Risks and Vaccine Information for Older Adults, CDC, https://www.cdc
.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/older-adults.html [https://perma.cc/BS
3L-7K8J].
45
Raheleh Heidari, Tenzin Wangmo, Serena Galli, David M. Shaw & Bernice S. Elger,
Accessibility of Prison Healthcare for Elderly Inmates, a Qualitative Assessment, 52 J.
FORENSIC & LEGAL MED. 223, 227 (2017).
46
Susan J. Loeb, Darrell Steffensmeier, & Frank Lawrence, Comparing Incarcerated and
Community-Dwelling Older Men’s Health, 30 W. J. NURSING RSCH. 234, 245 (2008).
47
Id. at 235–36.
48
Stephanie Grace Prost, Meghan A. Novisky, Leah Rorvig, Nick Zaller & Brie Williams,
Prisons and COVID-19: A Desperate Call for Gerontological Expertise in Correctional
Health Care, 61 GERONTOLOGIST 3, 4 (2021).
49
KEVIN T. SCHNEPEL, COUNCIL ON CRIM. JUST., COVID-19 IN U.S. STATE AND FEDERAL
PRISONS (2020), https://covid19.counciloncj.org/2020/09/02/covid-19-and-prisons/ [https://
perma.cc/8GP6-8HVQ].
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die from COVID-19 compared to the general population.50 This is likely
because prisoners more frequently suffer from a chronic illness and are older
on average—both of which increase the chance of complications from
infection.51
In the overcrowded conditions often present in prisons, prisoners cannot
protect themselves against outbreaks. Though social distancing is an
effective method of controlling the spread, prisons generally do not permit
prisoners to self-isolate.52 Even when prisons implement social distancing
efforts, prisoners assert that these efforts often still involve close quarters.53
This problem is compounded by the fact that prisons are frequently
overcrowded. The United States prison population quadrupled between 1975
and 2015; in many prisons, this resulted in “prisoners sleeping in gyms and
hallways or triple- and quadruple-bunked in cells.”54 Ventilation in prisons is
generally poor, so prisoners are “constantly breathing recirculated air.”55
While prisoners can utilize sanitation methods available to them, many
facilities do not permit prisoners to have “basic cleaning or sanitation
supplies that contain alcohol,” and some facilities do not provide “even the
most rudimentary access to hygiene such as antimicrobial soap.”56 This has
been exacerbated by the shortages of basic hygienic supplies including
wipes, hand sanitizer, and disposable thermometer covers.57 For a long time,
prisons have been prone to disease outbreaks, largely due to chronically

50

Id.
See Matthew J. Akiyama, Anne C. Spaulding & Josiah D. Rich, Flattening the Curve
for Incarcerated Populations — Covid-19 in Jails and Prisons, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2075,
2076 (2020).
52
Id.
53
See Christopher Blackwell, In Prison, Even Social Distancing Rules Get Weaponized,
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 28, 2020, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/
28/in-prison-even-social-distancing-rules-get-weaponized [https://perma.cc/9NZD-2FHV].
54
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, OVERCROWDING AND OVERUSE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (May 2015), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Over
Incarceration/ACLU.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR84-LWUE].
55
Sharon Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet COVID-19, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Nov.
16, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/11/16/covid-dolovich/ [https://perma.cc/
3EAA-UK3M].
56
Oluwadamilola T. Oladeru, Nguyen-Toan Tran, Tala Al-Rousan, Brie Williams &
Nickolas Zaller, A Call to Protect Patients, Correctional Staff and Healthcare Professions in
Jails and Prisons During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 8 HEALTH & JUST. 1, 2 (2020); Clark
Neily, Decarceration in the Face of a Pandemic, CATO INST. (Apr. 30, 2020, 6:25 PM), https:
//www.cato.org/blog/decarceration-face-pandemic [https://perma.cc/NP9Y-KJCL].
57
Bryn Nelson, A COVID-19 Crisis in US Jails and Prisons, 128 CANCER
CYTOPATHOLOGY 513, 514 (2020).
51
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unsanitary conditions.58 Ultimately, prisoners are powerless to keep COVID19 out of prisons. They cannot require prison staff and officials to take
measures to prevent their own infection, and prison staff often bring the virus
into the facilities.59
While many prisons have taken steps to prevent the spread of COVID19, these policies are often inadequate or unrealized. Prisons have instituted
a variety of policies, such as “establishing enhanced cleaning protocols;
providing for the distribution of masks, gloves, and cleaning supplies;
requiring isolation of the infected; limiting movement and transfers between
facilities; and ordering residents to socially distance as much as possible.”60
Unfortunately, there is often a “yawning gap” between the announced
policies and their implementation, as courts have found that prisons did not
abide by their own stated standards.61 Although courts have established some
minimum standards of care for detainees through injunctive relief,62
prisoners still face significant risks with no end in sight.
II. APPLICATIONS OF DURESS AND NECESSITY DEFENSES TO PRISON
ESCAPES
In theory, there is a distinction between the affirmative defenses of
duress and necessity. Generally, the necessity defense takes the form of
justification; criminal acts are justified if they avoid a greater evil.63
58
Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1047, 1048 (2007) (listing many examples of unsanitary conditions, such as
inadequate general hygiene, hand hygiene, laundry, and housekeeping).
59
See, e.g., Joseph P. Smith, Cumberland County Blames Corrections Officers for
Bringing COVID into Jail, DAILY J. (Oct. 29, 2020, 3:57 PM), https://www.thedaily
journal.com/story/news/2020/10/29/nj-cumberland-county-jail-coronavirus-covid-outbreakblame-police-benevolent-association/6074799002/ [https://perma.cc/32GL-SZK2]; Jessica A.
York, Santa Cruz County Correctional Officer Party Under Investigation as Source of
COVID-19 Outbreak, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Dec. 2, 2020, 10:34 AM), https://www.santacr
uzsentinel.com/2020/12/02/santa-cruz-county-correctional-officer-party-under-investigationas-source-of-covid-19-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/A9UB-XDH7].
60
Dolovich, supra note 55, at 5.
61
Id.; see also Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 688 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that
compliance with the stated sanitation policies and procedures of California’s Santa Ana Jail
was “piecemeal and inadequate.”).
62
Mays v. Dart, 456 F. Supp.3d 966, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2020). The court issued a preliminary
injunction order requiring the sheriff to institute several measures to protect pre-trial detainees
at Cook County Jail in Chicago, IL, including increasing access to soap, social distancing
during jail intake, and providing facemasks to “detained persons who are quarantined.” Id.
63
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Am. L. Inst. 1962) (defining necessity as “[c]onduct
that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is
justifiable, provided that . . . the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
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Necessity involves a scenario where a defendant “chooses to act in a way that
the law ultimately approves.”64 Duress takes the form of an excuse by
acknowledging that the law does not approve of the criminal act but
recognizing that the behavior resulted from coercion—it involves “a threat
of harm made to compel a person to do something against his or her will or
judgment . . . [which] practically destroys a person’s free agency.”65 Given
these definitions, necessity involves a response to external pressure from any
source, whereas duress focuses on pressure from another person. While these
defenses are historically distinct, recent decisions have blurred the line
between them in the context of prison escapes, and they are often offered in
tandem without practical distinction.66 As they relate to prison escapes, this
Comment will refer to them as “duress and necessity” or “justification”
defenses in the interest of clarity.
Criminal defendants are not entitled to present justification defenses to
the jury by default.67 First, the court examines whether the defendant offered
sufficient evidence that a “reasonable juror” could decide that the required
elements are met.68 In most cases, the court unilaterally determines that the
defendant failed to meet this burden.69 When the court decides that the
defense is available, the jury decides whether it applies to the case at hand.70
While jury instructions for these defenses vary considerably by jurisdiction
and based on the nature of the offense,71 a standard necessity instruction must

than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged); Necessity, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term as “a justification defense for a person
who acts in an emergency that he or she did not create and who commits a harm that is less
severe than the harm that would have occurred but for the person’s actions.”).
64
Duress, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (citing Thomas Morawetz,
Necessity, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 957, 959 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983)).
65
Id.
66
See George L. Blum, Duress, Necessity, or Conditions of Confinement as Justification
for Escape from Prison, 54 AM. L. REPS. 141; United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 397
(1980). The distinction between justification and excuse defenses has faded in other contexts,
as well. See Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and
the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1170 (1987).
67
Kyle Bettigole, Defending Against Defense: Civil Resistance, Necessity and the United
States Military’s Toxic Legacy, 21 BOS. COLL. ENV’T. AFF. L. REV. 667, 672 (1994).
68
Laura J. Schulkind, Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 103–04 (1989); John Alan Cohan, Civil Disobedience and the Necessity
Defense, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 111, 112 (2007).
69
Schulkind, supra note 68.
70
See Cohan, supra note 68, at 112.
71
See United States v. Westbrook, 896 F.2d 330, 337 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that “the
trial court has broad discretion in choosing the form and language of jury instructions.”).
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advise the jury that “they may acquit the defendant if they find that given all
the circumstances the defendant reasonably believed the results of breaking
the law would be a lesser evil than the result of keeping the law.”72
For most of U.S. history, it was “well settled” that intolerable prison
conditions did not justify prison escape under a duress or necessity defense.73
Still, escapees offered a variety of related rationales for their offenses.74 In
1965, the California Court of Appeals implicitly acknowledged that a
justification defense may be available to escapees in People v. Wester.75 In
Wester, the defendant escaped from state prison and was captured two days
later.76 At trial, he argued that another prisoner forced him to escape, which
he offered as an excuse for his actions.77 The trial court instructed the jury
that a prisoner whose departure was “influenced . . . by threats or menaces
which create in his mind a fear of imminent and immediate danger . . . does
not commit the crime of escape by such departure.”78 The appeals court
approved of this instruction but noted that it “strains the imagination” to
contemplate a situation where “a puny prisoner might fear for his life if a
fellow convict demanded that he escape with him and backed the demand
with threats of physical violence.”79 Despite the classic necessity example of
escaping a burning prison, courts refused to allow justification defenses to
prison escape.
A. STATE COURT: PEOPLE V. LOVERCAMP AND ITS PROGENY

In the early 1970s, state courts started to abandon the prohibition on
justification defenses to prison escape. Nine years after its decision in Wester,
the California Court of Appeals confirmed that the necessity defense was
available to prison escapees in People v. Lovercamp.80 The court outlined a
specific factor test to determine whether the rationale behind an escape met

72
Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law:
The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 299 (1975).
73
State v. Palmer, 72 A.2d 442, 443–44 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1950).
74
See, e.g., State v. Cahill, 194 N.W. 191, 193 (Iowa 1923) (discussing an inmate
subjected to a bread-only diet and cell infested with bugs and other vermin); Dempsey v.
United States, 283 F.2d 934, 934 (5th Cir. 1960) (describing a diabetic inmate who claimed to
require an immediate insulin injection, which was withheld from him).
75
46 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
76
Id. at 701.
77
Id. at 703.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1974).
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the requirements of duress or necessity, which greatly influenced subsequent
decisions in California and other states.81
In Lovercamp, two women escaped from a drug rehabilitation center
after frequent threats of sexual violence; other women at the center
challenged them to “fuck or fight.”82 Despite complaining to prison
authorities, nothing was done.83 Eventually, the defendants were forced to
fight, after which the threats continued.84 This caused them to fear for their
lives, and they believed they had “no choice but to leave the institution in
order to save themselves.”85 After their escape, they were “promptly
captured.”86 The trial court did not allow the defendants present a necessity
defense to the jury, and they were convicted of escape.87
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the court of appeals determined
that the defendants presented sufficient evidence to submit a necessity
defense to the jury.88 The court provided a set of requirements that a
defendant must satisfy to successfully proffer a duress or necessity defense:
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or
substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time for a complaint
to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result
from such complaints illusory; (3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison personnel or other
‘innocent’ persons in the escape; and (5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper
authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat.89

In establishing this test, the court was keenly concerned about the
possibility of solidifying the availability of justification defenses in
subsequent prison escapes cases.90 In an attempt to prevent “the spectacle of
hordes of prisoners leaping over the walls screaming ‘rape,’ [the court]
hasten[ed] to add that the defense . . . [was] extremely limited in its
application.”91 However, as long as the evidentiary requirements were

81
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83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
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Id. at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct. App. 1974).
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
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minimally satisfied, “[w]hether any of the conditions requisite to this defense
exist is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact . . . .”92
Following Lovercamp, other state courts applied justification defenses
to prison escape.93 However, state courts must consider legislative definitions
of the justification defenses when there is a relevant statute.94 As a result,
some states have adopted portions of the Lovercamp test while altering or
excluding factors that do not align with statutory directives.95 In state court,
defendants have had some success in presenting their duress and necessity
defenses to the jury.96
B. FEDERAL COURT

To date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted a singular
definition of necessity or duress, though it has acknowledged the availability
of the defenses.97 Unlike in many states, neither duress nor necessity is
defined by federal law, which gives federal courts broad discretion to
determine the requirements for the defenses.98 However, in Dixon v. United
States, the Supreme Court utilized the district court’s requirements for the
duress defense and presumed their accuracy.99 The defense required that:
(1) The defendant was under an unlawful and imminent threat of such a nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; (2) the
defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed herself in a situation in which it was

92

People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1974).
See People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319, 319 (Ill. 1977); Esquibel v. State, 576 P.2d 1129,
1131–32 (N.M. 1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wilson, 867 P.2d 1175 (N.M.
1994); State v. Horn, 566 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Haw. 1977); Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 439
N.E.2d 832, 835 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982); State v. Culp, 900 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1994).
94
Stephen S. Schwartz, Is There a Common Law Necessity Defense in Federal Criminal
Law?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1259, 1275 (2008).
95
See Horn, 566 P.2d at 1380 (replacing the requirement of “a specific threat of death,
forcible sexual attack, or substantial bodily injury” with “specific and articulable conditions
within the prison exist which seriously expose the prisoner to severe injury”); Culp, 900
S.W.2d at 710–11 (applying only the second and fifth elements of the Lovercamp test to
comport with the state’s statutory definition of necessity, which required only that “(1) [t]he
person reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm;
[and] (2) [t]he desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to
ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing
the conduct . . .”).
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See Culp, 900 S.W.2d at 710–11; Esquibel, 576 P.2d at 1133.
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See, Schwartz, supra note 94, at 1260.
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See Schwartz, supra note 94, at 1263 n.16.
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Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 n.2 (2006).
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probable that she would be forced to perform the criminal conduct; (3) the defendant
had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, that is, a chance both to refuse
to perform the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm; and, (4) that a direct
causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal act and the
avoidance of the threatened harm.100

The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar test in United States v. Aguilar,
which several other circuit courts subsequently adopted.101 This test requires
defendants to show that
“(1) [they were] faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that [they]
acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that [they] reasonably anticipated a direct causal
relationship between [their] conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) that [they had]
no legal alternatives to violating the law.”102 In a previous case, the Circuit considered
the requirements as they apply to prison escapes and noted that, because prison escape
is a continuing offense, an escapee must “submit to proper authorities immediately after
attaining a position of safety.”103

In United States v. Bailey, the Supreme Court considered similar
questions to Lovercamp: whether duress and necessity defenses are available
in federal court to prisoners who flee prison to escape intolerable conditions
and what these defenses require.104 In Bailey, the prisoners escaped from a
District of Columbia jail because the guards subjected them to beatings and
death threats and set fires in their cellblock among other insufferable
conditions.105 One of the escapees also alleged that he received inadequate
medical care.106 After three-and-a-half months on the run, each escapee was
recaptured by the authorities.107 Two of the escapees attempted to justify their
refusal to return to custody by alleging that the FBI was looking for them and
intended to shoot them on sight.108

100

Id.
United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989) (examining the application
of the necessity defense to a scenario involving smuggling political refugees into the United
States); See also United States v. Dorrell, 758 F.2d 427, 430–31 (9th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Duclos, 214 F.3d 27, 33 (1st
Cir. 2000).
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Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 693; United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991)
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United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1977).
104
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409–11 (1980).
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Id. at 398.
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Id.
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Id. at 396.
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Ultimately, the Bailey Court determined that the justification defenses
were unavailable.109 The Court stated that, “in the context of prison escape,
the escapee is not entitled to claim a defense of duress or necessity unless
and until he demonstrates that, given the imminence of the threat, violation
of” the law is the “only reasonable alternative.”110 This violation continues
until the escapee surrenders to the authorities; illegality does not stop after
the initial breakout.111 Because of this, for a necessity defense to go to the
jury, the proponent must “offer evidence justifying his continued absence
from custody as well as his initial departure.”112 Implicit in this assessment
is a requirement that escapees make a “bona fide effort to surrender or return
to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive
force.”113 During their long absence from custody, the prisoners never
attempted to surrender, so they failed to satisfy this requirement.114 As such,
the Court did not consider whether the prisoners’ initial escape was
justified.115
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority’s requirement
that escapees attempt to surrender was improper; instead, an escapee only
needed to justify his continued absence if recaptured.116 Referring to the
majority’s requirement as “naive,” the dissent argued that dangerous prison
conditions may still exist at the time of recapture.117 Blackmun argued that
escapees “should be permitted to submit evidence to the jury to demonstrate
that surrender would result in his being placed again in a life- or healththreatening situation.”118 Given the prisoners’ proffered concerns related to
their safety in returning to custody, Blackmun adamantly concluded that they
“did indeed submit sufficient evidence to support a [jury] verdict of not
guilty.”119 Some federal courts have required an attempt to surrender
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Id. at 417.
Id. at 410–11 (emphasis added).
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immediately after escape in subsequent cases, legitimizing Justice
Blackmun’s concerns.120
III. BAILEY’S BONA FIDE ATTEMPT REQUIREMENT: FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS
Since Bailey, state courts and lower federal courts have been similarly
unwilling to submit defenses of duress and necessity to the jury,121 especially
in cases involving prison escape. These decisions often focus on the failure
of an escapee to make a “bona fide effort to surrender.”122 However, prior to
Bailey, state courts which considered similar questions applied justification
defense standards in more ambiguous terms that allowed juries to determine
whether the threat inside the prison had abated while the escapee was on the
run.123 In doing so, these courts more closely followed the traditional
definitions and rationales underlying duress and necessity defenses by
acknowledging that prison conditions may still pose an imminent threat to
escapees for the duration of their absence.
While the Supreme Court correctly noted that precedent established that
an escapee must return once a threat has reasonably abated, it incorrectly
rejected the respondents’ assertion that a bona fide attempt at surrender
should be “just one factor” in the analysis.124 Escape from prison is a
continuing offense that does not end until the escapee is caught or
surrenders,125 but imminent threats within prison walls can also continue after
escape. In ruling that the defendant must have “surrendered or offered to
surrender at their earliest possible opportunity,”126 the Court did not
explicitly answer the obvious question: what is the requirement to surrender
if the prison is still dangerous when a prisoner is caught?
The Bailey Court did not specify a reasonable duration for an escape
before this required attempt, merely that it must occur “as soon as the claimed
120

See, e.g., United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Capadona, No. 98-cr-00432-EWN, 2007 WL 9718019, at *2 (D. Colo. May 21, 2007).
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See, e.g., United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1126 (10th Cir. 2006).
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See People v. Scott, 551 N.E.2d 288, 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that Bailey
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fide effort to surrender); Craddock v. State, 424 A.2d 168, 170 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
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surrender.
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Bailey, 444 U.S. at 412.
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Id. at 413.
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duress or necessity ha[s] lost its coercive force.”127 The Court did not address
what would occur if the prisoners were captured prior to the time that the
threat had lost this coercive force, because the case involved a particularly
long absence from custody.128 As a practical application, the Court’s
interpretation may require an escapee to elude capture until the precise time
that the threat has abated. Alternatively, allowing juries to decide whether the
escapee returned at the requisite time without a hardline requirement of an
attempt to surrender—as permitted by Michigan, California, Texas, and
Massachusetts courts129—does not implicate these timing problems and
better conforms to the traditional requirements for the justification defenses.
Several decisions—including Lovercamp—cite a simple public policy
rationale justifying a strict standard of proof for duress and necessity defenses
to prison escape: decisions favorable to prisoners will result in more escape
attempts.130 However, this is far from an inevitable consequence. A Michigan
appeals court considered and rejected this possibility when allowing an
escapee to present a necessity defense.131 While the court noted that more
escape attempts could theoretically result, it determined that the standard of
proof required to obtain a jury verdict of not guilty was extremely high.132 As
the court predicted, it does not appear that prisoners have interpreted this
ruling as an open invitation to escape. Between 2010 and 2017, there were
an average of 0.75 escapes per year from Michigan Department of
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Id.
See id. at 396.
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See People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1974) (“Because the
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at the first available opportunity.”); People v. Pitcock, 184 Cal. Rptr. 772, 773 (Ct. App. 1982)
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App. 1981); Spakes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Commonwealth
v. Thurber, 418 N.E.2d 1253, 1257 (Mass. 1981).
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Corrections facilities.133 The availability of justification defenses does not
mean that there is a reasonable expectation of success that would encourage
reckless or unnecessary attempts.
In fact, there are significant legal and public policy arguments that favor
loosening the Bailey requirements rather than maintaining a needlessly high
bar. On a basic level, these defenses require the defendant to avoid a greater
evil through criminal conduct,134 and society should encourage individuals to
engage in behavior that results in a better outcome. Domestic criminal law is
founded on the assumption that individuals will “perceive what is ‘right’
and . . . act freely in accordance with that perception.”135 It is impossible for
federal and state criminal codes to account for all possible scenarios in which
individuals will have to make difficult choices. This is exemplified through
the famous hypothetical situation involving escape from a burning prison; it
is “common sense” that a prisoner should escape a burning prison rather than
burn alive.136 Just as courts should permit prisoners to contend that their
escapes were necessitated by fire, avoidance of other serious injuries
constitutes a strong policy rationale for the availability of the defense and,
thus, a more lenient standard.
Justice Blackmun’s Bailey dissent references another danger presented
by the court’s stringent requirement: it does not allow the jury to decide
legitimate questions of fact, which are “routine grist for the jury mill.” 137
Juries play a vital role in the criminal justice system, and their “fact-finding
authority must extend to all facts that constitute elements of the criminal
offense.”138 Instead of allowing the jury to determine whether the escapees’
continued absence was justified based on their fear of deadly force upon their
return, the Bailey Court determined that the escapees’ statements and those
of their witnesses were “[v]ague and necessarily self-serving.”139 This
directly conflicts with the jury’s established role as the “system’s lie detector
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at criminal trials.”140 The Court essentially usurped the jury’s ability to decide
whether this testimony met the basic requirements of the justification
defenses by determining the credibility of their statements and
reasonableness of their concerns. Judgments as a matter of law should be a
“rare occurrence in criminal cases,”141 and judges should practice restraint to
avoid overstepping their role.
The Court’s institution of a specific evidentiary requirement is both
inappropriate and unnecessary. Alternatively, the Court could have made a
surrender attempt a consideration in the analysis or required intent to
surrender once the threat inside the prison had abated. Instead, it determined
that an attempt to surrender was an “indispensable element” for justification
defenses to prison escape.142 This has had a considerable impact; some courts
have been unwilling to allow prisoners to present evidence of continuing
threats within the prison as justifications for their continued absence.143
Notably, the Ninth Circuit requires that escapees make a bona fide attempt to
surrender as soon as they reach an objective “position of safety.”144 In United
States v. Michelson, the Ninth Circuit prevented the escapee from presenting
a justification defense to the jury despite being beaten by a prisoner who later
threatened his life, because he failed to report to the authorities after
escaping.145 As such, the circuit did not allow the jury to decide whether the
escape was justified because the threat in the prison was ongoing, even
though the escapee would presumably return to the control of the same prison
authorities with the same prisoners who threatened him. This sets an
unreasonably high bar for prisoners, as they must be objectively aware of the
conditions inside the prison to know when surrender would no longer
jeopardize their safety.
IV. JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES TO PRISON ESCAPE IN THE CONTEXT OF
COVID-19
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic presents a new scenario that will
likely involve the presentation of justification defenses after attempts to
escape an outbreak within a prison or obtain medical care outside the prison
140
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after infection. In claiming these defenses, defendants will face several
significant hurdles to their success. Generally, federal courts have used the
Ninth Circuit’s Aguilar test, which requires defendants to show that they
chose the lesser of two evils, acted to prevent imminent harm, reasonably
anticipated the causal relationship, and lacked legal alternatives. This
Comment will analyze these requirements separately. Additionally, the
Bailey “effort to surrender” requirement most closely relates to the
prevention of imminent harm, as it questions the defendant’s motivation for
continuing to elude the authorities, so it will be considered in the imminent
harm section. State courts, and potentially federal courts, may choose to
adopt the Lovercamp test. However, this test is adopted state by state, so the
following analysis focuses on the test as many federal courts have adopted it.
A. CHOOSING THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS

The requirement that a defendant choose the lesser of two evils when
justifying his actions inherently involves a balancing test between the harm
avoided and harm caused by the criminal conduct. Courts rarely determine
that the harm caused by the defendant outweighs the avoided evil,146 but an
escape in response to COVID-19 presents particular considerations. General
considerations for the harm caused by criminal conduct include “the harm
caused to persons, . . . the harm caused to property, . . . the harm caused to
social institutions, [and] . . . the harm caused by disrupting the social
order.”147
While an escapee could cause nominal damage during a prison escape,
the first two factors mostly contemplate the harm caused by the escapee’s
subsequent acts. There is a general prohibition on necessity defenses after
engaging in violent acts during or after the prison escape,148 so escapees are
unlikely proffer justification defenses if they cause more than minute
physical harm. The court will likely consider property damage caused during
and after the escape if it exists.
The harm caused to social institutions and social order involves the
inherent consequences of a prison escape. The Lovercamp court
contemplated that one prison escape may encourage other attempts, and this
weighed on its consideration of the extent of the escape’s harm.149 If a court
146

William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases: Bring in the
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follows this reasoning, it could also consider the impact on society outside
prison. An escape could cause panic or uneasiness, but this may depend on
the characteristics of the offender (e.g., violent propensities) and public’s
knowledge (e.g., news coverage). Courts could liken this to felony gun
possession, where they have similarly considered the risk of encouraging
felons to possess guns in reliance on such defenses.150 However, when courts
consider the possibility of encouraging subsequent illegal acts, they broadly
interpret the harm caused by justification defenses, considering that the risk
of implicitly encouraging illegal behavior is present whenever a defendant
proffers such a defense. Further, consideration of this risk arguably goes
against the very essence of the necessity defense: encouraging individuals to
choose the lesser harm, even when it involves criminal conduct.
Nevertheless, these potential impacts are sometimes considered.151
The harm avoided by the prisoner is more straightforward: the negative
consequences of COVID-19. There are a variety of personal characteristics
that could influence the harm faced by the defendant, including age, chronic
medical conditions, and access to adequate medical care.152 A defendant with
a heightened risk of complications from COVID-19 or in a prison with
notably inadequate healthcare—or both—may have a better duress or
necessity argument than an otherwise healthy defendant in a prison with
exceptional medical care. Therefore, the extent of the harm that the escapee
faced will largely depend on the facts of the case.
B. ACTING TO PREVENT IMMINENT HARM

There is no generally accepted, quantifiable standard for the imminent
harm requirement. However, lack of medical care for an existing medical
condition can garner a necessity defense instruction if the harm is great
enough.153 In State v. Stuit, a prisoner escaped in search of medical care due
to a staph infection that had the “potential” to result in the loss of sight in his
left eye. The prisoner had previously lost his right eye, so this would have
150
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blinded him.154 While he was eventually convicted, the trial court allowed
the jury to hear his necessity defense, and the Montana Supreme Court upheld
the instruction.155 As COVID-19 infection could result in severe bodily harm
or death, escapees seeking to avoid the virus could furnish similar claims,.
However, the escapee will need to show that the harm is not just
theoretical. The Stuit defendant escaped after contracting a staph infection.156
Similarly, COVID-19 escapees could show imminence through infection.
The possibility of infection may also suffice if the outbreak is uncontrollable,
especially because several prisons had infection rates upwards of twothirds.157 An escapee will also need to show that medical care within the
institution cannot reasonably prevent complications.158 It may be difficult to
fulfill the imminence requirement if medical care is reasonably available,
especially if the prisoner does not have underlying health conditions that are
likely to cause significant issues. Even in San Quentin, where 28 of 2,243
infected prisoners died,159 courts may not consider the risk of severe health
consequences great enough for the average prisoner. However, even when
death does not result, COVID-19 often causes significant health issues such
as heart inflammation, impaired lung function, and kidney injury.160 Upon
infection, a prisoner can contend that these injuries are sufficiently imminent.
Again, this is particularly true if a prison is unprepared, or a prisoner is
vulnerable.
Bailey’s requirement of an effort to surrender presents a significant
hurdle for COVID-19 escapees, but it does not necessarily preclude them
from presenting justification defenses. Single outbreaks in prisons can last
154
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applicable to those situations where a prisoner had been denied requested medical care.”).
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for a considerable amount of time,161 and an escapee can contend that the
termination of the imminent harm necessitates the end of an outbreak or
implementation of proper preventative measures. Otherwise, escapees still
risk infection by returning—the very harm they sought to avoid. As noted,
this requirement warrants reconsideration, but it will require the escapee to
present evidence that the harm was sufficiently significant and imminent
upon his return to prison. An escapee can certainly contend that a COVID19 threat within a prison “justif[ies] his continued absence from custody” per
Bailey.162 However, medical justifications for prison escape have thus far
been limited to denial of required medical care,163 and it is unclear whether a
court would consider the risk of infection and subsequent complications
sufficient to justify an escapee’s continued absence.
C. REASONABLE ANTICIPATION OF THE DIRECT CAUSAL
RELATIONSHIP

The third element of the test—reasonable anticipation of the direct
causal relationship—does not generally cause problems for prison escapees.
However, causal connections cannot be overly ambiguous. For example, no
court has recognized that illegal forms of protest seeking to prevent a political
harm satisfy this requirement, because it is unclear whether the protestor can
reasonably expect the protest to prevent any harm.164 Conversely, courts
generally do not refuse to present justification defenses to prison escape to
the jury on this basis when the causal connection to the escape is coherent.
Insofar as the threat of COVID-19 is presented by incarceration and the
defendant escaped to avoid the resulting harms, he likely reasonably
anticipated the direct causal connection if the risk of infection is considerably
more serious in the prison compared to the surrounding community. Even
when the surrounding community has a high infection rate, an escapee may
be able to contend that he was able to take better preventative measures
outside of prison, such as social distancing, if such measures were not
adequately available in the facility.
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Often, courts have interpreted this standard as overlapping with the
imminence requirement,165 which could pose problems for escapees who are
not yet infected with COVID-19. In United States v. Alston, the court refused
to allow the presentation of a necessity defense to possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon where the defendant claimed that someone he testified
against said he was going to “get [him].”166 Because the defendant was not
faced with imminent harm during the entire time that he possessed the
weapon, the court found that the “causal relationship [between possession of
the firearm and threatened harm was] attenuated at best.”167 Accordingly, a
prisoner who has not yet contracted COVID-19 may have trouble meeting
the causal connection standard if the imminence of infection is not constant.
A prisoner could contend that risk of infection is constant and imminent if
the circumstances in the prison are dire, as the majority of the prison
population was infected at some prisons.168 Depending on the situation and
the application by the court, this argument may overcome this hurdle.
D. LACK OF LEGAL ALTERNATIVES

The requirement that the escapee has no legal alternatives to escape sets
a high bar. The Sixth Circuit noted that “the keystone of the [justification
defense] analysis is that the defendant must have no alternative—either
before or during the event—to avoid violating the law.”169 The defendant
cannot simply show that prison escape was the best option—it must be the
only reasonable option. While the reasonableness of alternatives is not part
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of the traditional test, it is implied by the standard examples of necessity
defenses, including prison escape.170
Conventionally, courts have hesitated to find that prison escape was the
only reasonable alternative to imminent harm. In one particularly troubling
decision, a prisoner escaped after another prisoner pressured him to “engage
in homosexual activity.”171 The court determined that he had a reasonable
and legal alternative to prison escape—“[t]he submission to sodomy”—even
if administrative remedies were insufficient.172 In determining whether his
actions were reasonable, the court weighed the “the destruction of the general
discipline of the prison” that could result from the escape against the harm
caused by “submission to sodomy,” and it affirmed the trial court’s denial of
a necessity defense instruction.173
Although recent decisions reflect a move away from this hardline
stance, this requirement still presents problems for COVID-19 escapees, but
they are not necessarily insurmountable. For a prisoner to show that he lacks
reasonable alternatives, he must either exhaust his administrative and judicial
remedies or show that his medical condition is urgent enough that he does
not have time to use these methods.174 To meet this standard, a prisoner who
has not yet contracted COVID-19 will only need to exhaust his administrative
and judicial remedies if they could reasonably prevent the harm. Legal
alternatives to escape must be “reasonable,” which means that the escapee
had “a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the

United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1991). The court stated that “the
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threatened harm.”175 For example, in federal prison, prisoners could request
compassionate release from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) through the First
Step Act, which allows for a reduction in sentence for “extraordinary and
compelling reasons.”176 However, the BOP has thirty days to make a
determination, and, in one prison, it approved only 1 of 836 applications
asking for release due to COVID-19 susceptibility through July 2020.177
After these thirty days, prisoners may petition the court for compassionate
release.178 Still, this may be too long to avoid contracting COVID-19 or
suffering from complications if the prisoner is already infected. Such
administrative remedies may be functionally unavailable.
Largely, the likelihood of meeting this requirement rests on the court’s
determination of the imminence of the risk. When there is a high infection
rate in the prison or another circumstance, such as a cellmate developing
symptoms during an internal outbreak, a prisoner can more readily meet this
standard. This is especially true when the prisoner has risk factors for severe
complications, given that they are more likely to suffer these harms if they
take the time to resort to administrative remedies. In such circumstances,
escape may be their only reasonable alternative.
CONCLUSION
COVID-19 presents a serious threat to prisoner health and safety, and
prisoners may resort to escape as their only option. While the analysis may
look different in states with statutory definitions of the duress or necessity
defense, the current federal requirements are untenable. The Bailey decision
requires escapees to make an effort to surrender. In doing so, the Court made
an improper evidentiary determination for the jury and did not adequately
account for situations where the threat inside prison continues longer than the
escape. The Court should reconsider this requirement and permit lower
courts to determine whether an escapee’s actions were appropriate given the
circumstances.
COVID-19 presents a situation where a threat may last for weeks or
months, and escape may be a legally justified option for prisoners who meet
the stringent requirements for the duress and necessity defenses. Largely,
175
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prisoners’ claims will depend on the severity and immediacy of the threat,
and whether alternative legal remedies are reasonably available. Ultimately,
prisoners should not assume that justification defenses excuse their escape
attempts regardless of the circumstances, but courts should allow them to
present these defenses when COVID-19 placed them in great peril.

